Wed

Nov 28
2007

Brady Forrest

Brady Forrest

Tech's Effect on Iraq

Noah Shactman of Wired's Defense blog Danger Room has written a mammoth article entitled How Technology Almost Lost the War: In Iraq, the Critical Networks Are Social — Not Electronic. As he writes on his blog:

The war was launched, in part, on a premise that you could wipe out more bad guys with fewer troops, as long as those troops were networked together. Businesses like Wal-Mart made their supply chain more efficient through information technology; the military could do the same with its "kill chain," the theory of network-centric warfare went.

The idea -- first popularized in article published ten years ago, next month -- pretty much worked as advertised, for a while. The problem is, killing people more efficiently is one of the last things you need to do a counterinsurgency situation, like the one the U.S. is facing in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead, you need to take steps to reinforce civil society, rather than blowing it apart. And that takes an understanding of the society you're trying to build.

For the story, I scored a rare opportunity to spend time with a U.S. "psychological operations" team, getting into the heads of the people of Fallujah; hung out with an Army colonel who worked his tribal connections to bring stability to one of Iraq's roughest towns; spent time with the heads of a controversial program to embed anthropologists into combat units; and interviewed General David Petraeus, the U.S. commander in Iraq.

I'm not going to make it through the piece today (I'm trying to launch the ETech site). It seems a worthy read for anyone who thinks that an over reliance on technology can be too much of a good thing in almost any situation or who's curious about what is going on over there.


tags: emerging tech, web 2.0  | comments: 3   | Sphere It
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Comments: 3

  monopole [11.28.07 02:17 PM]

It's much worse than an over-reliance or mis-application of technology, or having the means justify the end, it's mistaking a means for an end.

Jeff Huber just put up an excellent essay on this which can be summed up by the two quotes by Clausewitz:
"Policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument, not vice versa."
and
"If we do not learn to regard a war, and the separate campaigns of which it is composed, as a chain of linked engagements each leading to the next, but instead succumb to the idea that the capture of certain geographical points or the seizure of undefended provinces are of value in themselves, we are liable to regard them as windfall profits."

The most efficient "kill-chain" won't do squat unless there is a clear and achievable objective. The other problem is that the "kill-chain" that is being used is purpose built for set piece battles between great powers basically 2nd generation warfare (web 1.0) versus 4th generation asymmetric warfare.

You don't even need Clausewitz, Powell will suffice. To use a shortened version of the Powell doctrine:
- Do we have a clear attainable objective?
- Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
- Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted?
- Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
- Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?

  bartb [11.29.07 08:46 AM]

Don't waste you time reading the article (like I did).

Why?

See here:
http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/2007/11/wireds_subpar_iraq_analysis.html

  brady [11.30.07 09:22 AM]

Just saw a response on Noah's blog to Thomas' blog post.

http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/11/-----------forw.html

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